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Should EU states prioritise foreign policy cooperation through the EU or through NATO? Alexander
Mattelaer writes that the balance between the EU and NATO has tipped increasingly toward the
latter in recent years. However, he argues that this trend is no cause for transatlantic celebration as
Brexit, upheaval in Turkey and other developments threaten to undermine the West’s security
architecture.
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Ever since the 2014 Wales Summit, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has been making a scarcely
noticed comeback as Europe’s primary security institution. The heads of state and government proclaimed ‘a pivotal
moment in Euro-Atlantic security’ and took a series of far-reaching decisions. When they met again in Warsaw in
July 2016 it became clear that the Alliance had indeed turned a corner. In several ways, however, this evolution has
been riddled by paradox and surprise. In this contribution I highlight seven paradoxes characterising this past
trajectory, setting the stage for an in-depth review of the transatlantic relationship once Donald Trump takes office.
1. Fractured US politics, but consensus on NATO
First, while the political landscape in the US is deeply fractured, a strong bipartisan consensus on NATO persists.
Democrats and Republicans may agree on little else, but the idea that European allies are important remains
fundamentally unchallenged. The Trump campaign obviously ruffled some feathers with the suggestion that US
support in case of attack is not unconditional. Despite Trump’s characteristic theatrics, similar concerns over
transatlantic burden-sharing are widely shared across the US defence community. Even Barack Obama – a
President much more liberal and dovish than Hillary Clinton would have been – loudly complained about European
free-riding behaviour. On few issues is the US position so clear as on NATO: the alliance matters, but allies must
pull their weight, or else…
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2. NATO’s revival despite talk of a European army
Second, while talk about a European army has newfound popularity – at least in the media – the real debate about
European defence has swerved back to NATO. At the same time, even far-reaching decisions (such as those on
setting up an enhanced forward presence in Poland and the Baltic states) are met with little more than a yawn. In the
United Kingdom, the idea that the EU might set up a military headquarters is treated as a matter of more serious
concern than the posting of UK troops in Estonia. Even as the latter play the role of trip-wire for what could
conceivably amount to world war three, such commitments do not raise meaningful debate. NATO’s comeback, as
evident as it is to the defence community, has occurred in relative silence in the public debate about European
affairs.
3. Rising European defence spending
Third, contrary to all expectations, European defence expenditure trends are slowly turning up. The NATO defence
investment pledge undertaken at the Wales summit was at the time met with considerable scepticism. But ever
since, an increasing number of allies have been hiking up their defence budgets , some of them very significantly so.
Perhaps even more of a surprise is the security policy turn-around in Germany, traditionally one of the most
reluctant allies. In sync with a new defence white paper, Berlin announced an increase of its number of military
personnel as well as a 1.7 billion euro defence budget hike for 2017 (corresponding to a 6.8% rise from earlier
plans). When German social-democrats start making the case for defence, you know something is afoot.
4. A familiar strategy in a time of change
Fourth, despite all the talk about the changing character of war, the key tenets of NATO’s strategy in 2016 look
decidedly familiar. Without much controversy, the Warsaw summit declaration dusted off the language on nuclear
deterrence. ‘Any employment of nuclear weapons against NATO would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict’,
the summit communiqué read. Message to Moscow: don’t even think about scenarios of nuclear de-escalation
following a conventional land-grab. Simultaneously, the forward stationing of NATO units along the alliance’s eastern
flank (through a system of rotational deployments) served to give material credibility to the article five commitment.
While enlargement has changed the geography of the alliance, current defence planning efforts display a
remarkable conceptual continuity with those of the Cold War. As one observant journalist remarked, ‘Europe’s
militaries are once again training in earnest for war in their own backyard.’
5. Disinformation tactics
Fifth, despite the familiarity of the military aspects of NATO’s posture, the non-military dimension to geopolitical
competition has continued to increase in importance. Both Russia and the so-called Islamic State have proven
themselves to be most proficient in leveraging disinformation tactics as the centrepiece of their campaign for
undermining the unity and cohesion of Western societies. Years of operational experience in the Balkans and
Afghanistan familiarised NATO with the importance of the so-called ‘comprehensive approach’. Yet still, the
alliance’s political leadership seems to be caught off guard by the idea that other actors may pursue a similar line of
reasoning and target the hearts and minds of all disaffected constituencies in the West.
6. European defence as crisis management
Sixth, while European political leaders may talk the talk that ‘defence matters’, they continue to approach the new
defence debate with earlier crisis management operations in mind. Many seem to approach collective defence plans
through the methodology and vocabulary of crisis management: forces need to be made available and command
caveats can be imposed on their use. Yet preparations for collective defence are far from being non-committal
exercises. In case of actual conflict there may well be no time for additional political deliberation and guidance. Such
strategic thoughtlessness is all the more remarkable given that many allies have also started employing their armed
forces for other purposes on their national territory, ranging from refugee management to counter-terrorism tasks.
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Even as the security environment has deteriorated considerably, the idea that soldiers ultimately serve to kill or be
killed in the defence of their country continues to be relatively alien to most European audiences.
7. Geopolitical turbulence
Seventh, NATO’s revival is no cause for transatlantic celebrations, because at the same time the broader Western
architecture continues to disintegrate. The United Kingdom has chosen to leave the European Union, Turkey
struggles to overcome the recent coup d’état while remaining anchored in the West, and the domestic politics of
many allies are nothing but precarious. In that sense, NATO’s comeback is not a sign of Western unity, but rather a
signal of distress in a new era of geopolitical turbulence.
When Donald Trump and all other NATO heads of state and government meet in Brussels in the spring of 2017, they
will confront a situation that in terms of uncertainty and danger has perhaps more in common with the 1950s than
with any other period in the alliance’s history. Can they continue to set store by the strategic concept their
predecessors endorsed in 2010, at a time when economic clouds darkened but geopolitical rivalry still seemed a
long way off? It may not be the most auspicious moment for transatlantic renewal, but that does not make it any less
urgent. When the fabric of Western liberal democracy is fraying, time may be running out.
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